اسم المؤلف:
اروى نوري نديم المياحي
اسم المشرف:
هلال ثجيل جلوي الخفاجي
المستخلص:
The message deals with the Palestinian issue …reflection on the events of the Arab world , for the period from the events of September 1970 AD , in Jordon , And the October war with Israel first , and followed the camp David treaty and its repercussions onthe Arab world and the conclusion of the Lebanese and their impact on the overall Arab history of war and also the Israel occupation of Lebanon in 1982 AD. The message had been reached among the results , but the most important is that the Palestinian.Issue has a dual effect on Arab situation and events either directly or indirectly. As well as the most prominent Israeli army defect in the fact of guerrilla war fare , Which the Israeli army is not fluent in dealing suffered big losses as the peace process led by Egypt did not come to a comprehensive peace did not stand in dependent of the chain wars swept the region. As Lebanon came under two bread categories in the year 1978 AS and 1982Ad , but Israel did not achieve its targets of these attacks , either militarily shaken the prestige and power of the Israeli army to the public , The Israeli and international public opinion. criticism of the regime's policies. Numerous journalists were dropped from the party or arrested last month. In February Sadat launched his diplomatic initiative, the main elements of which were Hafiz Ismail's visits to the Soviet Union and the United States. Sadat was roundly criticized in some Arab circles for opening a dialogue with the United States, especially after the news leaked that the US was preparing to continue supplying Israel with large quantities of arms and production facilities for aircraft.The Content of the Speech Sadat began his two and one - half hour speech by 124 Foreign Relations, 1969 - 1976, Volume XXV 50. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Schlesinger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)iWashington, April 16, 1973. SUBJECT : Israeli Estimates of Egypt's Present Military Intentions Recent assertions regarding the probability of Egyptian military moves against Israel are in conflict with the assessment the Israeli military intelligence has provided the United States as recently as the end of last week. Other indicators of Egyptian military intentions remain negative. On 12 April 1973, General Shalev, Deputy Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence, told the American Defense Attache' in Tel Aviv that he does not believeEgyptian President Sadat has made a decision to renew hostilities against Israel or that he will decide to do so in the near term. Shalev outlined at considerable length his reasons for reaching this conclusion despite certain recent developments in the Egyptian military, notably the transfer from Libya to Egypt of Libyan Mirage V aircraft, which have given rise to questions about present Egyptian intentions. A copy of the Defense Attache"s report of this conversation with Shalev is provided as Attachment A2 to this memorandum. Attachment B 118 Foreign Relations, 1969 - 1976, Volume XXV (Memorandum of conversation, March 8; ibid.) Regarding the Soviet paper handed to Kissinger by Brezhnev during Kissinger's April 1972 visit to Moscow, see Foreign Relations,1969 - 1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971 - May 1972, Document 141, footnote 5. On March 14, Brezhnev sent Nixon a message describing his talks in Moscow with Egypt's Minister of War, Ahmed Ismail, who had expressed the Egyptian Government's serious concern with the absence of any progress toward a peace settlement. Egypt had been subjected to Israeli aggression for six years and Arab lands were still occupied by Israel. Ismail had declared that although it preferred a peaceful settlement , the Egyptian Government was coming to the conclusion that military confrontation with Israel might become unavoidable. Therefore, Egypt had to prepare itself for the possibility of a new military clash. Brezhnev concluded his message by saying that he wanted to emphasize again the seriousness of the developing situation in the Middle East and to draw the President's attention to the necessity of taking constructive steps in order to prevent such a confrontation. Brezhnev argued that such a turn of events would not only cause irreparable damage to the countries in the region but hurt other countries as well. Therefore, much depended on having the Soviet Union and the United States take "agreed steps directed at settlement of the Middle East situation."(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 70,5 Country Files, Europe, USSR, Exchangeof Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 5) January 2 - October 5, 1973 123 42. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixom Washington, March 30, 1973. SUBJECT : Fuller Analysis of President Sadat's Speech The Daily Brief has contained the main points in President Sadat's speech of March 26. This memo includes a more extensive discussion and analysis, and excerpts of the section on foreign policy are attached.2Background Sadat has been struggling with troublesome domestic problems since last fall. Student riots in January were followed by press 1. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)l Washington, January 2, 1973. SUBJECT : Secret Jordan - Egyptian Negotiations At Tab A2 is a memorandum from Director Helms conveying detailed information on secret negotiations between a representative of King Hussein andPresident Sadat which took place on 17 December. The key item is Sadat's assertion that he has decided Egypt must launch a war of attrition against Israel. Zayd Rifai represented King Hussein at the talks which took place in Cairo. In essence, the King proposed that Egypt and Jordan resume diplomatic relations and that they work together through political efforts to force a settlement on Israel. Rifai stated that the Arabs cannot risk another full scale war with Israel. He argued that the Soviets, having reached an understanding with the U.S. , do not wish to do anything that might jeopardize their newly - established working relationship with the Americans.Thus, according to Rifai, the United States is the only country in a position to break the present impasse and force the Israelis to withdraw from occupied Arab territories. Rifai informed Sadat that it is for this reason that on King Hussein's last visit to WashingtonS he attempted to take the problem out of State Department channels and bring it to President Nixon's office. Sadat expressed pleasure at Hussein's initiative in sending an emissary to meet him. He denied having any direct contacts with President Nixon's representatives but he said that he had received letters from President Nixon, all of which he had answered. Sadat told Rifai that he disagreed with Hussein on the Soviet role in the Middle East, asserting that Moscow does have a role to play inbringing about a solution to the Middle East problem , even though it is secondary to the role played by the United States. Sadat informed Rifai that his major disagreement with Hussein's views is in regard to the question of war versus political pressure on Israel. Sadat stated that he is absolutely convinced that the only way to force Israel to surrender the occupied territories is by renewing a war of attrition. He said that he had carefully calculated the cost to Egypt of starting such a war and he believes that it can be sustained. By hitting hard and deep inside Israel and by inflicting a sizeable number of civilian casualties on a regular basis, Egypt could force Israel into deciding that it is better to surrender the occupied territories. Sadat also told Rifai that under no circumstances should Jordan in any way become involved in Egypt's war of attrition because the Israelis would quickly overrun the East Bank and destroy the Jordanian army. Sadat also pushed aside Rifai's question about resuming normal diplomatic relations betweenJordan and Egypt. Sadat closed by telling Rifai that he would have some thoughts to convey to Hussein on what he could say to President Nixon about Egypt.
